Compulsory Education: Weak Justifications in the Aftermath of Wisconsin v. Yoder by Smith, Cynthia B.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 62 | Number 6 Article 10
8-1-1984
Compulsory Education: Weak Justifications in the
Aftermath of Wisconsin v. Yoder
Cynthia B. Smith
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cynthia B. Smith, Compulsory Education: Weak Justifications in the Aftermath of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 1167 (1984).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol62/iss6/10
Compulsory Education: Weak Justifications in the Aftermath
of Wisconsin v. Yoder
Free exercise of religion is a right protected by the first amendment.' De-
spite the constitution's simple declaration, however, courts repeatedly have
struggled to balance the individual's right to religious freedom against the
state's competing interest in governing society.2 This familiar dilemma re-
curred recently in the context of North Carolina's compulsory education stat-
ute.3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found in
Duro v. District Attorney, Second Judicial District of North Carolina4 that de-
spite plaintiff's religion-based aversion to structured education, North Caro-
lina could compel plaintiff's children to attend state-sanctioned schools. 5 The
Duro court did not clarify how the competing interests in freedom of religion
cases should be balanced, but merely added to the voluminous materials ad-
dressing the issue of an individual's freedom of religious expression in our
society.
Duro and his wife have six children, five of whom are school-aged.6 The
Duros are Pentecostalists.7 Although this religion does not require that chil-
dren be educated at home, the Duros' interpretation of Pentecostalism did.8
Specifically, Duro worried that exposing his children to people who did not
share the family's religious beliefs would corrupt them. Additionally, he was
opposed to what he called the "unisex movement where you can't tell the dif-
ference between boys and girls and [which advocates] the promotion of secular
humanism." 9 Because of these beliefs, Duro refused to enroll his children in
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The first amendment was applied to the states
via the fourteenth amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See generally Clark, Guidelinesfor the Free Exer-
cise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REv. 327 (1969); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doc-
trinal Development, Part L" The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. Rav. 1381 (1967).
3. North Carolina's compulsory education statute requires regular school attendance for
children between the ages of seven and sixteen. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (1983). The statute
also provides: "No person shall encourage, entice or counsel any such child to be unlawfully
absent from school." Id. Evidence that the parents were notified of thirty accumulated absences
by their child that cannot be justified establishes a prima facie case that the parent is responsible
for the absences. Id.
4. 712 F.2d 96 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 998 (1984).
5. Although North Carolina has deregulated nonpublic schools, all schools still must satisfy
certain criteria. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-547 to -557 (1983).
6. Duro, 712 F.2d at 97.
7. Id. Although the Duro court did not examine the sincerity of Duro's religious views,
many cases have pinpointed the genuineness of "religious" views as a relevant issue. See, e.g.,
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931);
Delconte v. State, 65 N.C. App. 262, 308 S.E.2d 898 (1983).
8. Duro, 712 F.2d at 97.
9. Id.
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state-sanctioned schools and elected to have his wife teach them at home. t0
Duro's refusal to send his children to school caused him to be charged in
1981 with violating the North Carolina compulsory school attendance law.'I
Duro filed suit alleging that the State's application of the statute was unconsti-
tutional as applied because his religious beliefs prohibited him from sending
his children to school. The federal district court granted Duro's motion for
summary judgment. 12 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that North Carolina could compel Duro to send his chil-
dren to a regular school because the State's interest in compulsory education
was stonger than his interest in freely directing his children's religious
training.13
To understand the Duro decision, it is necessary to examine the 1971
United States Supreme Court decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 14 Yoder in-
volved a challenge to the constitutionality of the Wisconsin compulsory educa-
tion statute as applied to the Amish people. Is On the basis of the Amish tenet
that separation from the world is fundamental to salvation,' 6 the parents in
Yoder removed their children from formal schools after the eighth grade so
that they could be taught the attitudes, and be trained in the skills, necessary
for life in the simple, agrarian Amish community. 17
The Yoder Court, recognizing the importance of the free exercise of reli-
gion in our constitutional scheme, announced its guidelines for determining
whether Wisconsin could compel the Amish to attend school past the eighth
grade: "[Ilt must appear either that the State does not deny the free exercise of
religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state interest of sufficient
magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise
Clause."'18 The Yoder Court acknowledged that Wisconsin law compelled the
Amish to perform acts undeniably at odds with their three hundred year-old
religion;19 therefore, state compulsion could not be allowed under the first part
of the test. The Court concluded that the second prong of the test was not
10. Id. The court noted that Mrs. Duro did not have a teaching certificate and never had
been trained as a teacher. For a discussion of what qualifies as a school under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 115C-555 (1983), see Delconte v. State, 65 N.C. App. 262, 266-67, 308 S.E.2d 898, 902-03 (1983)
(§ 115C-555(4) refers only to established educational institutions).
11. Duro was charged with four violations of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (1983); the war-
rants were quashed for technical defects. Duro, 712 F.2d at 97.
12. Id. The district court opinion was not published.
13. Id. at 99.
14. 406 U.S. 205 (1971). For a general discussion of Yoder, see Note, Wisconsin v. Yoder:
The Right to Be Dfferent-First Amendment ExemptionforAmish Under the Free Exercise Clause,
22 DE PAUL L. REv. 539 (1972); Note, Freedom ofJReligon-The Amish and Their Right to Reject
Compulsory School Attendance Beyond the Eighth Grade, 24 MERCER L. REV. 479 (1973).
15. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209.
16. Id. at 210. The Amish shun modem conveniences to promote a purer, simpler lifestyle,
See generally Comment, The Amish and Compulsory School Attendance: Recent Developments,
1971 Wis. L. REv. 832; Note, The Right Not to Be Modern Men: The Amish and Compulsory
Education, 53 VA. L. REv. 925 (1967).
17. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 211.
18. Id. at 214.
19. Id. at 218.
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satisfied because Wisconsin's interest in compulsory education-having an in-
formed citizenry-was fulfilled adequately by the Amish alternative to formal
secondary school education. 20
Wisconsin's final argument was that exempting Amish from the statute
denied the children their substantive right to an education.2' The Yoder
Court rejected this argument for two reasons. First, since the criminal penal-
ties of the statute fell upon the parent, not the child, it was the parents' inter-
ests in religious freedom that was impeded. Second, the Yoder Court
recognized the fundamental interest that parents have in guiding the religious
future and education of their children and characterized their interest as an
"enduring American tradition."22 In conclusion the Yoder Court stated:
Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious
sect and a long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of
American society, the Amish in this case have convincingly demon-
strated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, . . .and the hazards
presented by the State's enforcement of a statute generally valid as
to others. Beyond this, they have carried the even more difficult bur-
den of demonstrating the adequacy of their alternative mode of con-
tinuing informal vocational education .... 23
The Court emphasized that the exemption from the statute was narrow and
was not intended to undermine the general applicability of the statute.24
The court of appeals' decision in Duro relied heavily on language in the
Yoder opinion, but reached a different result. The Duro court began by iden-
tifying the two issues that Yoder had characterized as mandatory considera-
tions: whether the individual's religious expression was being infringed upon
by the state, and whether the state had demonstrated a competing, overriding,
compelling interest.25 The Duro court recognized the validity of plaintiff's
allegation that his religious expression was being hampered by the State and
allowed him to satisfy the first prong of the Yoder balancing test. Despite the
20. Id. at 235. The Yoder Court also noted that because they had received a basic education,
Amish children would be prepared to reenter secular society if they desired. Id. at 224. Some
commentators doubted whether an eighth grade education adequately prepares a person for
worldly life. See, e.g., Note, The Balancing Process for Free Exercise Needs a New Scale, 51
N.C.L. REV. 302, 308-09 (1972).
21. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 229. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion was based on the right of the
child to an education. See id. at 241-49 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Comment, The Educa-
tion oftheAmish Child, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1506, 1515-31 (1974); cf. Note, supra note 20, at 309-10.
22. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232.
23. Id. at 235.
24. Id. at 236. Many commentators believed that because the Yoder exception was so nar-
row, the case set a meaningless precedent. See Note, Balancing Test Employed to Resolve Conflict
Between State Statute and Resulting Burden on Free Exercise of Religion--State Interest in Compul-
sory High School Attendance Outweighed by Resulting Burden on Free Exercise of Amish Religion,
18 VILL. L. REV. 955, 967 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Balancing Test Employed]. Cf. Kur-
land, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75
W. VA. L. REV. 213, 244-45 (1973); Note, Freedom and Public Education: The Needfor New Stan-
dards, 50 NOTRE DAME LAw. 530, 540-44 (1975).
25. Duro, 712 F.2d at 97. The Duro court stated that the two issues in Yoder were "(1)
whether a sincere religious belief exists, and (2) whether the state's interest in compulsory educa-
tion is of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claimed by the parents." Id.
11691984]
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genuineness of Duro's religious beliefs, however, the court concluded that
Yoder arose in "an entirely different factual context" 26 and therefore was not
controlling. According to the court, it was the "unique facts and circum-
stances associated with the Amish community" 27 that mandated the Yoder re-
suit. In distinguishing Duro from Yoder the court stated:
The Duros, unlike their Amish counterparts, are not members of
a community which has existed for three centuries and has a long
history of being a successful, self-sufficient, segment of American so-
ciety. Furthermore, in Yoder, the Amish children attended public
school through the eighth grade and then obtained informal voca-
tional training to enable them to assimilate into the self-contained
Amish community.28
The second part of the Duro opinion contained a disappointingly shallow
discussion of the State's interest in education. The Duro court stressed the
continuing, vital interest the State has in private schools and rejected the dis-
trict court's conclusion that North Carolina had abdicated its interest in non-
public education.29 Without defining the nature or purposes of the State
interest in education, the court noted evidence of the State interest's strength
in state-required attendance records, standardized testing, and disease immu-
nization requirements in private schools, as well as in fire, health, and safety
standards.30 These regulations demonstrated to the Duro court the compelling
nature of North Carolina's interest in education.31 The court also mentioned
that since "Duro [had] not demonstrated that home instruction [would] pre-
pare his children to be self-sufficient participants in our modern society or
enable them to participate intelligently in our political system,"'32 the State's
interest in education prevailed over Duro's interest in religion.33
In a lengthy footnote, the Duro court explained that in addition to the
mandates of Yoder, its chief consideration was the welfare of the children.34
The State's interest in "[t]heir well-being, along with their state constitutional
right to an education" 35 convinced the court that state sanctioned education
was appropriate. The Duro court compared denying children an education to
neglecting them, because both wrongs occur in environments injurious to their
welfare.3 6 The State's interest in the children's welfare indicated a sufficiently




30. Id. These requirements are contained in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-548 to -558 (1983).
31. Duro, 712 F.2d at 99.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 99 n.3.
35. Id. The court also remarked that "Article 1, § 15 of the North Carolina Constitution
expressly provides that, 'It]he people have a right to the privilege of education and it is the duty of
the State to guard and maintain that right." Id.
36. Id. The Duro court borrowed this analogy from Matter of McMillian, 30 N.C. App. 235,
238, 226 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1976). McMillian involved parents who had been charged with neglect
1170 [Vol. 62
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
strong State interest in compulsory education to override Duro's religious free-
dom claim.
Two factors in Duro suggest that the result was correct. First, in contrast
to the facts in Yoder, Duro insisted on controlling all levels of instruction for
his children. Obviously, the State interest in education becomes stronger when
the child has not received even a basic education in approved schools. 3 7 Sec-
ond, the Duro result seems justified in that Mr. Duro planned to send out his
children at age eighteen to make their way in society. In contrast, the Amish
children in Yoder were expected to lead simple, traditional agrarian lives; their
vocational training adequately prepared them for their future. The prospect
that Duro's children would reenter secular society heightened North Caro-
lina's interest in directing their education.38
Although it is apparent that Duro's outcome was correct, the court's logic
and reasoning are disturbing. First, Duro misinterpreted the nature of the
right to religious freedom that was recognized in Yoder. Although the Yoder
Court limited its discussion of religious expression to the peculiarities of the
Amish community, it is a mistake to read that case as narrowly as the Duro
court did. The Duro court found that the situation was sufficiently different
from that of the Amish and, therefore, Yoder was not controlling. 39 Yet, in
allowing the Amish an exemption from the Wisconsin statute, Yoder did not
impose a new set of requirements that must be met before an individual's in-
terest in religion can triumph over the state's education interest. Yoder did not
hold that only Amish people will be allowed religious exemptions from com-
pulsory education statutes; rather, the Yoder Court concluded that, in the par-
ticular case of the Amish, an exception was justified.40 The fact that the
Duros' religion and situation did not conform to those of the Amish should
have been irrelevant to the court's analysis of Duro's first amendment claims.
The first amendment protects individuals' freedom to practice any religion,
not merely the freedom to be Amish.
The second problem with Duro is the court's inadequate discussion of
North Carolina's interest in education. Surely there is stronger evidence of the
State's interest in education than its health and fire regulations. Presumably,
of their children under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278(4) (1976) (repealed by Act of June 7, 1979, ch.
815, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 966).
37. The nature of the state's interest in educating its citizenry has not been articulated clearly.
See Note, Balancing Test Employed, supra note 24, at 962. One commentator suggests that the
state's interest in education is the selfish one of making each citizen more productive. See Kur-
land, supra note 24, at 215.
38. Duro, 712 F.2d at 99.
39. Id.
40. The Court's rationale for providing an exception to the Amish was that societal diversity
should be respected:
We must not forget that in the Middle Ages important values of the civilization of
the Western World were preserved by members of religious orders who isolated them-
selves from all worldly influences against great obstacles. There can be no assumption
that today's majority is "right" and the Amish and others like them are "wrong." A way
of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not
to be condemned because it is different.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 223-24.
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the State's legitimate interest in education is in having an informed electo-
rate.41 By summarily concluding that Duro failed to show that he had pre-
pared his children to be intelligent members of society, the court glossed over
what should have been an important component of its analysis.
A third problem with the Duro court's rationale was its offhand pro-
nouncement that the children's welfare was the primary issue in the case.4 2
Although this consideration could be the basis for compelling school attend-
ance in another context,43 in Duro it was entirely inconsistent with Yoder. In
Yoder Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion argued that children's rights were
determinative;" the Yoder majority, however, made clear that the relevant
issue was the parents' right to direct freely their children's religious training.
Thus, the question of the allowable extent of parents' religious control over
their children is an unresolved and controversial issue.45 The Duro court's
quick reference to the children's welfare as a justification for its decision
dodged the issue of the parents' right to direct their children's religious
training.
The Duro decision is a deceptively simple opinion resting on questionable
premises. The issue of whether a state may compel a child's education against
the wishes of his parents was resolved only partially in Yoder. North Caro-
lina's right to compel the Duro children's school attendance in contravention
of their father's religious beliefs warranted a more convincing definition of the
State's interest than the court offered in Duro.
CYNTHIA B. SMITH
41. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), expanded on the importance of education:
"Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment." Id. at 493.
For a suggestion that Yoder is inconsistent with this aspect of Brown, see Note, supra note 20, at
307.
42. Duro, 712 F.2d at 99 n.3.
43. Yoder recognized that children's rights would be relevant if there was a conflict between
the wishes of the parent and those of the child. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 231-32.
44. Id. at 241-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs:
Justfcations and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383 (1974).
45. Some of the most interesting cases on this point involve the Jehovah's Witnesses. For a
collection of these cases, see Note, Their Life is in the Blood- Jehovah's Witnesses, Blood Transfu.
sions and the Courts, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 281 (1983).
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